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ABSTRACT
Location-sharing-based services (LSBSs) allow users to share
their location with their friends in a sporadic manner. In
currently deployed LSBSs users must disclose their location
to the service provider in order to share it with their friends.
This default disclosure of location data introduces privacy
risks. We define the security properties that a privacy-
preserving LSBS should fulfill and propose two construc-
tions. First, a construction based on identity based broad-
cast encryption (IBBE) in which the service provider does
not learn the user’s location, but learns which other users
are allowed to receive a location update. Second, a construc-
tion based on anonymous IBBE in which the service provider
does not learn the latter either. As advantages with respect
to previous work, in our schemes the LSBS provider does
not need to perform any operations to compute the reply
to a location data request, but only needs to forward IBBE
ciphertexts to the receivers. We implement both construc-
tions and present a performance analysis that shows their
practicality. Furthermore, we extend our schemes such that
the service provider, performing some verification work, is
able to collect privacy-preserving aggregate statistics on the
locations users share with each other.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce–
Distributed commercial transactions; Security
Keywords
Location Privacy; Broadcast Encryption; Vector Commit-
ments
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1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of mobile electronic devices with position-
ing capabilities (e.g. through the Global Positioning System,
GPS), such as smart phones and tablet computers, has fos-
tered the appearance of a wide variety of Location Based
Services (LBSs). With these services, users can find nearby
places of interest, share their location with friends, and ob-
tain information about their surroundings.
Location-sharing-based services (LSBSs) permit users to
share their current location or activity with other people.
The shared location data may be in the form of GPS co-
ordinates, although in GeoSocial Networks (GSN), such as
Foursquare and Facebook-check-in, it is common that users
announce their location in a more socially meaningful way by
providing the venue (e.g., name of the restaurant) at which
they are currently present. The action is commonly referred
to as check-in. Every day millions of users enjoy GSN and
share millions of locations with each other.1
While LSBSs are indeed useful, the disclosure of location
data raises significant privacy concerns. Service providers
and other third parties with access to accurate location data
can infer private user information, such as their movement
patterns, home address, lifestyle and interests [25]. Further,
making these inferences is even easier if users share the venue
rather than just submitting coordinates, as any uncertainties
introduced by possible inaccuracies in the GPS coordinates
are removed. We note that, although GSNs offer config-
urable privacy settings [27], they are still privacy invasive,
as the LSBS provider learns the users’ location regardless of
the privacy settings.
Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) that
implement obfuscation strategies, such as adding dummy
locations [35] or reducing precision [31], are unsuitable for
LSBS. This is because, when transmitting an obfuscated lo-
cation to the service provider, the service provider naturally
is only able to forward this obfuscated location to the user’s
friends. This conflicts with the main functionality of LSBSs.
Therefore, LPPMs have been proposed in which users share
keys allowing them to encrypt and decrypt their location
data [22, 45]. In those solutions, the LSBS provider stores
encrypted location data and computes the reply for a user
1https://foursquare.com/about/
http://www.socialbakers.com/blog/
167-interesting-facebook-places-numbers
requesting location data of her friends. A provider offering
such an LSBS is unable to learn statistics about its users’
whereabouts. Consequently, this renders the common busi-
ness model of offering a free service in exchange for the users’
data impossible. An alternative is to offer a paid service, but
this might only be feasible if the fees are sufficiently low.
In this paper we propose two schemes based on identity-
based broadcast encryption [20]. The first protocol reveals
the identities of the friends that should receive location in-
formation to the LSBS provider and also to the other re-
ceivers of that location information. In the second protocol,
those identities are hidden towards the service provider as
well as towards other users (including the receivers of the
location update), thanks to the use of anonymous identity-
based broadcast encryption. The advantage over existing
work is that in our schemes the LSBS provider does not
need to perform complex operations in order to compute a
reply for a location data request, but only needs to forward
data. This reduces the cost of an LSBS provider that is
then able to offer its service for a lower price if pursuing a
subscription-based business model. Furthermore, we extend
our schemes such that the service provider is able to collect
privacy-preserving statistics on the locations shared by the
users. This extension does require the LSBS provider to per-
form additional computations. The obtained statistics could
be monetized to compensate for this additional overhead or
to facilitate a free service.
We have implemented both schemes on a Samsung S III
mini smart phone and provide results on the computation
time, bandwidth overhead and energy consumption. Our
evaluation shows that the performance of the first scheme
is independent of the number of users in the system. Fur-
thermore, it imposes minimal computational and bandwidth
overhead on both, the LSBS provider and the users’ mobile
devices. In the second scheme a user is able to choose a
trade-off between privacy, computation and bandwidth over-
head. We study this trade-off and provide recommendations
to increase the level of privacy for the same amount of re-
sources.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we review previous work on privacy-preserving
location-based services and argue that none of the existing
approaches is suitable for implementing privacy-preserving
LSBSs. We define privacy-preserving LSBS in Section 3.
In Section 4, we introduce our two schemes. We provide a
detailed performance analysis showing the feasibility of our
approach in Section 5. In Section 6, we extend our schemes
to allow for aggregate statistics collection. We discuss our
approach and results in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8 we
conclude our work.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section we review obfuscation-based LPPMs and
argue that they are not suitable for protecting location pri-
vacy in LSBS. Subsequently, we review LPPMs that rely
on cryptographic primitives. Some of them have been de-
liberately designed for protecting location privacy in LSBS;
others have a more general purpose. Our evaluation shows
that obfuscation-based LPPMs are not suitable for privacy-
preserving LSBS and that our system has several advantages
over existing privacy-preserving LSBS.
Other works have examined location privacy in GSNs con-
sidering a different threat model. Gambs et al. [27] and Vi-
cente et al. [48] review several GSNs and analyze their pri-
vacy issues. However, in their privacy evaluation, they do
not consider it to be a privacy breach if the service provider
learns the user locations. An analysis of the inferences that
can be made about users based on where they check-in while
using Foursquare is provided by Pontes et al. [43].
2.1 Obfuscation-based LPPMs
While works like [22, 45] have already noted that LPPMs
based on anonymization and precision-reduction are not suit-
able to protect location privacy in LSBS, we provide here
a more detailed evaluation. We therefore follow the cat-
egorization in [47] which distinguishes between these four
obfuscation strategies: location hiding, perturbation, adding
dummy regions, and reducing precision. In the following we
argue that none of these obfuscation-based LPPMs are ap-
plicable to protect location privacy in LSBSs. We therefore
consider the following LSBS application scenario: A user
A is currently at one of her favorite locations and wishes to
share this information with her friends. This could be either
because A simply wants to inform her friends, or to enable
them to join her at this place.
The location hiding strategy [4] consists of not sending the
location data to the LBS and is thus impractical. In this
case user A would not be able to share her location with
her friends. Some LPPMs propose to change pseudonyms
after a period of location hiding [32, 37]. However, this is
also impractical, because the check-in is supposed to be re-
ceived by the same set of friends and therefore identifies
user A. LPPMs that rely on perturbation submit a location
different from A’s actual location [34]. As a rather incon-
venient result, the user’s friends learn a wrong place and
if they decide to join their friend, they would realize upon
arriving that A is actually not present there. The adding
dummy regions strategy [35] consists of submitting fake lo-
cations along with the user’s actual location. In this case A
would check-in at several places and her friends could not
distinguish real from fake check-ins. Finally, with the re-
ducing precision strategy [31] A would send a cloak region
that contains her current location, but she would not re-
veal her precise whereabouts, making it extremely difficult
for her friends to find her. We note that with all obfusca-
tion strategies, users could rely on personal contact in order
to obtain A’s precise location after learning the obfuscated
location. However, such a system would have significant us-
ability issues. The key limitation of these techniques is that
they do not make a distinction between information revealed
to friends and to the service provider. Thus, in order to pro-
tect their location information towards the service provider,
users must lower the quality of location information shared
with their friends.
2.2 Cryptographic LPPMs
Freudiger [26] proposes that users should use symmet-
ric or asymmetric encryption and use the service provider
solely as a rendez-vous point to exchange encrypted data.
Longitude by Dong and Dulay [22] propose to use proxy-
encryption, which guarantees that the service provider is
not able to learn the location update and, furthermore, that
the ciphertext can be modified by the service provider such
that only intended receivers are able to successfully decrypt.
Puttaswamy et al. [45] propose a scheme which combines
encryption with location transformation in order to build a
location-based application, such as privacy-preserving LSBS.
As already mentioned in Section 1 the proposed LPPMs im-
pose a computational overhead at the LSBS provider, which
makes offering such a service more expensive. In our schemes
the cost for the LSBS provider is kept at a minimum in order
to make running such a service as cheap as possible. Further-
more, the service provider can decide to engage in additional
computation overhead and therefore obtain statistics about
its users’ whereabouts. We note that this overhead is kept
low since the service provider only needs to forward data
and verify zero-knowledge proofs, whose cost can be reduced
using batch verification. Note however that our scheme, in
contrast to the works mentioned above, introduces a trusted
key generation center.
Carbunar et al. [16] propose privacy preserving protocols
for badge and mayor applications in GSNs. While this is
closely related to our work, their scheme does not allow users
to exchange their locations.
In privacy-preserving friend nearby notification, users can
privately learn whether a friend is in close proximity. Such
a service can be realized by homomorphic encryption [50],
private equality testing [41] and private threshold set inter-
section [39]. These protocols are different from our solution,
because in privacy-preserving location sharing protocols, lo-
cation updates are sent to friends regardless of their current
location, i.e. regardless of how close they are.
Bilogrevic et al. [5] propose two protocols to allow users
to compute a fair rendez-vous point in a privacy preserving
manner. This differs from our work in that we focus on
location sharing, and not on deciding on where to meet after
a group of users has deliberately decided to do so.
Popa et al. [44] propose a privacy-preserving protocol to
compute aggregate statistics from users’ location updates.
However, in this protocol users do not share their location
with other users.
Finally, some works employ Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) so that the users retrieve information (e.g., points of
interest) related to their surroundings [30, 42]. PIR could
in principle be employed to build privacy-preserving LSBS.
However, PIR operations are rather costly at the service
provider side which we again argue that introduces intoler-
able overhead for a service provider.
3. DEFINITION OF PRIVACY FOR LSBS
Our LSBS involves the following parties: a key generation
center, a service provider P and a set of users Ui for i = 1
to n. Figure 1 shows the parties in the system.
A privacy-invasive protocol that realizes the desired func-
tionality works as follows. A user Ui sends a message to the
service provider that indicates the place loc that Ui wishes
to share, and the set S ⊆ [1, n] of users Uj (j ∈ S) that
should learn that Ui shares loc. Then the service provider
forwards to users Uj ∈ S the message (Ui, loc) to inform
them that Ui has shared loc. As can be seen, this protocol
is privacy-invasive. The service provider learns the location
loc that Ui shares, and the identities of the users Uj (j ∈ S).
The privacy properties that our LSBS should fulfill are the
following:
Sender Privacy. No coalition of users U /∈ S and service
provider P should learn any information on loc.
User
ServiceProvider
KeyGeneration
Center
User
User User
Figure 1: System Model of a privacy-preserving LSBS. The
key generation center sets up the public parameters and pro-
vides users with secret keys. The service provider transfers
messages between users.
Receiver Privacy. No coalition of users Uj such that j 6=
{i, j∗} and service provider P should learn any infor-
mation on whether j∗ ∈ S or j∗ /∈ S.
Our schemes in Section 4 are secure against active adver-
saries, i.e., adversaries that deviate in any possible way form
the protocol execution. The security of our schemes relies
on the security of identity based broadcast encryption. The
key generation center is trusted, which is an assumption that
every identity-based cryptographic scheme makes.
4. CONSTRUCTIONS OF LSBS
Our schemes are based on identity-based broadcast en-
cryption, which we describe in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we
describe the sender private scheme, which fulfills the sender
privacy property. In Section 4.3, we describe the fully pri-
vate scheme, which fulfills both the sender privacy and the
receiver privacy properties.
4.1 Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
Broadcast encryption allows a sender to encrypt a mes-
sage m to a set of receivers S ∈ [1, n], so that no coalition
of receivers not in S can decrypt. A broadcast encryption
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ, n, `). On input the number of users n, the secu-
rity parameter 1λ, and the maximum size ` ≤ n of a
broadcast recipient group, output the public key pk
and the secret key sk .
KeyGen(i, sk). On input an index i and the secret key sk ,
output a secret key di for user Ui.
Enc(pk , S,m). On input the recipient group S ∈ [1, n], the
public key pk and the message m, output the cipher-
text c.
Dec(pk , di, c). On input the public key pk , the secret key di
of user Ui and a ciphertext c, output m if i ∈ S or else
the failure symbol ⊥.
In IBBE, a trusted key generation center KGC creates the
parameters and computes the secret keys of the receivers.
Note that the secret key sk allows the decryption of every
ciphertext. If ciphertexts c do not reveal the set of receivers
S, the broadcast encryption scheme is anonymous.
4.2 Sender-Private LSBS
Our sender-private LSBS (SPLS) uses an IBBE scheme
that is not anonymous. In such a scheme, ciphertexts c
contain a description of the recipient group S . Our scheme
works as follows:
Setup Phase. KGC executes the setup algorithm Setup(1λ,
n, `) on input the security parameter 1λ, the number
of users n and the maximum size ` ≤ n, publishes
the public key pk and stores the secret key sk . Users
obtain pk .
Registration Phase. Each user Ui registers with the ser-
vice provider by sending the index i. Additionally, Ui
receives the key di from KGC, which runs KeyGen(i,
sk).
Main Phase. To share a location loc, a user Ui runs c ←
Enc(pk , S, i ||loc) and sends c to the service provider P.
P gets S from c and sends c to the users Uj (j ∈ S).
Each user Uj runs Dec(pk , dj , c) to output the message
i ||loc.
We note that the registration and main phases can be inter-
leaved, i.e., users can join our SPLS dynamically.
Our scheme fulfills the sender privacy property. The IBBE
scheme ensures that no coalition of service provider P and
users U /∈ S can decrypt a ciphertext c computed on input
S. However, this scheme does not fulfill the receiver privacy
property. Since the IBBE scheme is not anonymous, the
ciphertext c reveals the identity of the receivers Uj (j ∈ S).
4.2.1 Construction of IBBE
In Section 5, we instantiate our SPLS with a broadcast
encryption scheme in order to implement it and evaluate its
performance. Broadcast encryption was first formalized by
Fiat and Naor [24]. The first fully collusion secure broadcast
schemes, i.e., schemes where security holds even if all the
users not in the recipient group S collude, were described
in [40]. The first public key broadcast encryption scheme
was proposed in [21].
In the schemes mentioned above, the size of the ciphertext
grows linearly with the size of the recipient group. Boneh,
Gentry and Waters [8] proposed the first schemes with con-
stant size ciphertexts. Their schemes have selective security,
i.e., the adversary should decide the target recipient group
to be attacked before the setup phase. Identity-based broad-
cast encryption was proposed in [20], which describes also
selectively secure schemes.
Broadcast encryption and identity-based broadcast en-
cryption with adaptive security was first achieved in [28].
These schemes achieve constant size ciphertexts in the ran-
dom oracle model and under q-based assumptions. In [49]
and [36], broadcast encryption schemes secure under static
assumptions are proposed. In [36], an identity-based broad-
cast encryption scheme secure under static assumptions is
also proposed, but it only achieves selective security.
The main property of identity-based broadcast encryp-
tion is that the scheme is efficient when the total number of
users n is exponential in the security parameter 1λ. Since
our SPLS could have millions of users, schemes that, de-
spite having constant size ciphertexts, have public key or
user secret keys of size that grows linearly with n are less
suitable. Therefore, we instantiate our SPLS with the adap-
tively secure identity-based broadcast encryption in [28].
This scheme, which is secure in the random oracle model,
in addition to constant size ciphertexts, has a public key of
size independent of n that grows linearly with ` and user de-
cryption keys di of constant size. The scheme in [28] employs
bilinear maps.
Bilinear maps.
Let G, G˜ and Gt be groups of prime order p. A map
e : G × G˜ → Gt must satisfy bilinearity, i.e., e(gx, g˜y) =
e(g , g˜)xy; non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators g ∈ G and
g˜ ∈ G˜, e(g , g˜) generates Gt; and efficiency, i.e., there exists
an efficient algorithm BMGen(1k) that outputs the pairing
group setup (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) and an efficient algorithm
to compute e(a, b) for any a ∈ G, b ∈ G˜. If G = G˜ the map
is symmetric and otherwise asymmetric.
Let (E,D) be a secure symmetric key encryption scheme.
The scheme in [28] works as follows:
Setup(1λ, n, `). On input the number of users n, the security
parameter 1λ, and the maximum size ` ≤ n of a broad-
cast recipient group, run (p,G,Gt, e) ← BMGen(1λ).
Set g1, g2 ← G. Set α, β, γ ← Zp. Set gˆ1 ← gβ1 and
gˆ2 ← gβ2 . Set pk = (p,G,Gt, e, n, `, gγ1 , gγ·α1 , {gα
j
1 , gˆ
αj
1 ,
gα
k
2 , gˆ
αk
2 : j ∈ [0, `], k ∈ [0, `− 2]}). Output pk and the
secret key sk = (α, γ).
KeyGen(i, sk). On input an index i and the secret key sk ,
pick random ri ← Zp and output
di = (i, ri, hi = g
γ−ri
α−i
2 )
Enc(pk , S,m). On input the recipient group S ∈ [1, n], the
public key pk and the message m, set τ ← {0, 1}O(λ).
Set F (x) as the (`−1)-degree polynomial that interpo-
lates F (i) = H(τ, i) for i ∈ S and F (i) = 1 for i ∈ [n+
j] with j ∈ [k+1, `], where H : {0, 1}O(λ)× [1, n]→ Zp
is a hash function modelled as a random oracle. Set
k = |S| and parse S as {i1, . . . , ik}. Set ij ← n+ j for
j ∈ [k+1, `]. Set P (x) =∏`j=1(x−ij). Set t← Zp and
set K ← e(g1, gˆ2)γ·α`−1·t. Set Hdr ← 〈C1, . . . , C4〉 =
〈gˆP (α)·t1 , gγ·t1 , gF (α)·t1 , e(g1, gˆ2)α
`−1·F (α)·t〉. Compute C
← E(K,m) and output c = (τ,Hdr, C, S).
Dec(pk , di, c). On input the public key pk , the secret key di
and a ciphertext c, parse di as 〈i, ri, hi〉, c as (τ,Hdr,
C, S) and Hdr as 〈C1, . . . , C4〉. Define P (x) as above
and compute F (x) from τ as above. Set
Pi(x) = x
`−1 − P (x)
(x− i) , Fi(x) =
F (x)− F (i)
(x− i) ,
and ei = − ri
F (i)
and
K ← e(C1, hi · gei·Fi(α)2 ) · e(C2 · Cei3 , gˆPi(α)2 )/Cei4 .
Output m ← D(K,C).
We note that a user of LSBS usually shares her location
with the same recipient group, i.e., with her friends. There-
fore, broadcast encryption is used to share a symmetric key
with that recipient group, and messages are encrypted using
an efficient symmetric key encryption scheme. Broadcast en-
cryption is used again only when the recipient group changes
or when the symmetric key should be renewed for security
reasons.
4.3 Fully-Private LSBS
Our fully-private LSBS (FPLS) uses an anonymous IBBE
scheme. In such scheme, ciphertexts c do not reveal the
recipient group. The setup and registration phases of this
scheme work as the ones described in Section 4.2. The main
phase works as follows:
Main Phase. To share a location loc, a user Ui runs c ←
Enc(pk , S, i ||loc) and sends c to the service provider P.
P forwards c to every user Uj such that j 6= i. Each
user Uj runs Dec(pk , dj , c) to get either the message
i||loc or ⊥.
As in the construction in Section 4.2, this scheme fulfills the
sender-private property. Additionally, this scheme fulfills
the receiver privacy property. Since the IBBE scheme is
anonymous, the ciphertext c does not reveal the identity of
the receivers Uj (j ∈ S).
This construction requires location updates to be broad-
cast to all users. Therefore, we propose a variant that allows
to trade-off communication efficiency and location-privacy.
In this variant, the map is divided into regions reg1, . . . , regr
and users reveal to the service provider the region where
they are located and the region from where they would like
to receive location updates.
Region Phase. A user Ui sends to the service provider the
region to which location updates she wishes to receive
should be associated.
Main Phase. To share a location loc ∈ reg, a user Ui runs
c ← Enc(pk , S, i ||loc) and sends (c, reg) to the service
provider P. P forwards c to every user Uj such that
j 6= i and reg equals the region sent by Uj in the Region
Phase. Each user Uj runs Dec(pk , dj , c) to get either
the message i||loc or ⊥.
4.3.1 Construction of Anonymous IBBE
In Section 5, we instantiate our FPLS with an anonymous
broadcast encryption scheme in order to implement it and
evaluate its performance. Barth et al. [3] propose an anony-
mous broadcast encryption scheme secure in the random or-
acle model where the ciphertext size is O(S). The public key
size is O(n), while user secret keys and decryption time are
constant. Libert et al. [38] proposed a scheme with the same
asymptotic performance but secure in the standard model.
Recently, a scheme with public key size O(n), secret key
size O(n), ciphertext size O(rlog(n
r
)), where r is the set
n − S, and constant decryption time was proposed in [23].
Despite the fact that in this scheme ciphertexts do not grow
linearly with n, actually O(rlog(n
r
)) is asymptotically larger
than O(n − r) for large values of r, which are likely in our
FPLS. Furthermore, the scheme in [23] does not provide
anonymity with respect to users who are able to decrypt,
i.e., those users can find out the identity of the other users
who can decrypt.
We modify the scheme in [3] so that it employs as build-
ing block an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme
instead of a key-private public key encryption scheme. This
allows users to employ their identities as public keys. Such
modification was suggested in Barth et al. [3] and security
follows from the security of the original scheme.
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme consists of the
algorithms (IBESetup, IBEExtract, IBEEnc, IBEDec). The al-
gorithm IBESetup(1λ) outputs parameters params and mas-
ter secret key msk . IBEExtract(params,msk , id) outputs the
secret key sk id for identity id . IBEEnc(params, id ,m) out-
puts ct encrypting m under id . IBEDec(params, sk id , ct)
outputs message m encrypted in ct .
An IBE scheme is anonymous [1] if it is not possible to
associate the identity used to encrypt a message m with the
resulting ciphertext. We employ the scheme in [7], which
is anonymous [9], to implement the anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme.
Another building block of the anonymous IBBE scheme is
a strongly existentially unforgeable signature scheme. A sig-
nature scheme consists of algorithms (Kg, Sign,Vf). Kg(1λ)
outputs a key pair (ssk , vsk). Sign(ssk ,m) outputs a signa-
ture s on message m. Vf(vsk , s,m) outputs accept if s is a
valid signature on m and reject otherwise. We employ the
scheme secure in the random oracle model proposed in [6].
The remaining building block is a secure symmetric key
encryption scheme (E,D). We employ the advanced encryp-
tion standard [19]. The anonymous IBBE scheme works as
follows.
Setup(1λ, n, `). Choose a group G of primer order p where
CDH is hard and DDH is easy and pick a generator
g ∈ G. Choose a hash function H : G→ {0, 1}λ which
is modeled as a random oracle. Compute params and
msk via IBESetup(1λ). For i = 1 to n, pick random
ai ← Zp. Output Output pk = (G, g, ga1 , . . . , gan , H,
params) and sk = (msk , a1, . . . , an).
KeyGen(i, sk). On input an index i and the secret key sk ,
compute a secret key sk i ← IBEExtract(params,msk ,
i). Output di = (sk i, ai).
Enc(pk , S,m). On input the recipient group S ∈ [1, n], the
public key pk and the message m, execute the following
steps.
1. Compute (ssk , vsk)← Kg(1λ).
2. Pick a random symmetric key K.
3. Pick random r ← Zp and set T = gr.
4. For each tuple (i, gai) ∈ S, set the ciphertext ci ←
H(gair)||IBEEnc(params, i, vsk ||gair||K).
5. C1 is the concatenation of all ci ordered by the
values of H(gair).
6. Compute C2 = EK(m).
7. Sign s ← Sign(ssk , T ||C1||C2).
8. Return the ciphertext C = s||T ||C1||C2.
Dec(pk , dj , c). On input the public key pk , the secret key dj
and a ciphertext c, execute the following steps.
1. Calculate l = H(T aj ).
2. Find cj such that cj = l||c for some cj in C1.
3. Calculate p← IBEDec(params, sk j , cj).
4. If p is ⊥, return ⊥.
5. Parse p as vsk ||x||K.
6. If x 6= T aj , return ⊥.
7. If Vf(vsk , s, T ||C1||C2) outputs accept, then out-
put m = DK(C2) else ⊥.
We remark that, if the user is not in the recipient group and
therefore she cannot decrypt, the decryption algorithm only
requires the computation of a hash function.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Location-sharing-based applications are usually run on a
mobile device, such as a smart phone or a tablet computer.
Therefore, the available resources at the client side are lim-
ited in terms of computational power and bandwidth when
on mobile connection. Furthermore, mobile devices usually
have a rather low battery capacity. Thus an application
must use the CPU or mobile communication interfaces, such
as WiFi or 3G, as moderate as possible in order not to drain
the battery too much. In order to evaluate the overhead of
our schemes, we implemented them in the C programming
language using the Pairing-Based Cryptography2 (PBC) li-
brary. Subsequently, we imported the schemes within An-
droid application using Android’s Native Development Kit3
(NDK) and tested the application on a Samsung S III mini
(1 GHz dual-core CPU) which runs the CyanogenMod4 op-
erating system.
In the following we provide the additional overhead im-
posed by our schemes. This overhead is due to the compu-
tation of cryptographic operations and due to the transmis-
sion of key material and ciphertexts. Mobile applications
for LSBSs, such as Foursquare, are used on a large user base
and the overhead imposed by these services is accepted in
practice.
For the energy consumption of our schemes, we measure
the different current consumption of the phone when the
CPU is idle and when the CPU load of one core is at the
maximum. We found that the difference is 150 mA at 3.8
V and thus that the power consumption is 570 mW if one
CPU core is at full load. Please note that we could not
use PowerTutor5 to estimate the energy consumption of our
schemes, because PowerTutor was designed for a Nexus 1
mobile phone. Although PowerTutor does also run on our
Samsung S III mini, the energy measurements are likely to
be inaccurate, because both phones have a different CPU
and we found that PowerTutor is unable to read the traffic
sent and received on our phone. For the runtime estima-
tion of our schemes, we executed our protocols 50 times
and computed the average. Multiplying the runtime with
the power consumption equals to the energy consumption of
our schemes.
The energy consumption of data transmission via a mobile
interface, such as WiFi and 3G, turns out to be significantly
more difficult. This is because the actual energy consump-
tion for sending and receiving data depends on many factors,
such as amount of data, time between two consecutive data
transmissions and network reception. We therefore use Bal-
asubramanian et al. [2] work to outline ways to minimize the
energy consumed by our schemes.
5.1 Evaluation of the Sender-Private LSBS
The complexity of the Gentry and Waters [28] scheme that
we employ for our SPLS only depends on the size of the max-
2http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
3https://developer.android.com/tools/sdk/ndk/
index.html
4http://www.cyanogenmod.org/
5http://powertutor.org/
imal broadcast group l. This means that for a given l, the
computational and bandwidth overhead for computing the
symmetric key stays constant, regardless of n (the number
of users in the system) or k (actual receiver of a broadcast
message). We therefore limit our evaluation to the system
parameter l.
As we can see in Figure 2a the time for creating the sym-
metric key increases polynomially with l. For a reasonably
large l, such as 100, our phone needs 8.66 seconds to com-
pute the symmetric key in the encryption protocol and 7.42
in the decryption protocol. While this appears to be rather
high, we must stress that a user is able to reuse a symmetric
key until the broadcast group changes or the key got com-
promised. Therefore, a single symmetric key can be used
for thousands of location shares. Furthermore, as we can
see in Figure 2b, the actual energy consumed for computing
a symmetric key is 4.94 Joule for the encryption protocol
and 4.23 Joule for the decryption protocol, which is very
low. The capacity of the standard battery of a Samsung S
III mini (3.8 V and 1500 mAh) is 20520 Joule and therefore
computing even dozens of symmetric keys per day would not
drain the battery too much.
We show the bandwidth overhead of the FPLS in Fig-
ure 2c. For creating a new symmetric key a user needs to
send 788 byte of data to the receiver of the broadcast group.
Please note that even for k > 1 the user only needs to send
788 byte instead of k×788 byte, because the service provider
forwards the traffic to the intended receivers. The public key
of our scheme grows linearly in l. However, please note that
the public key only needs to be sent very rarely. This is
when a user signs up for the service, the new user receives
the public key from the service provider, and if the service
provider decides to increase/decrease the size of the maximal
broadcast group and thus changes the parameter l. In those
cases, all the users in the system receive the new public key.
5.2 Evaluation of the Fully-Private LSBS
In the following we will first show that the computational
overhead that is imposed by the FPLS is feasible for current
mobile devices. Subsequently we will show that the FPLS
imposes a significant bandwidth overhead. This is a prob-
lem for two reasons. Firstly, data plans usually include a
fixed data volume to be transmitted before either the speed
of the connection gets throttled or additional costs incur.
Secondly, using mobile communication interfaces, such as
3G or WiFi, is expensive in terms of energy and therefore
sending and receiving higher amounts of data additionally
drains the battery. However, we make several suggestions
on how our protocol should be deployed to significantly re-
duce the energy consumption, although the transferred data
volume remains the same. Furthermore, as introduced in
Section 4.3, the concept of big regions greatly helps in mak-
ing the FPLS feasible. We therefore consider the FPLS as a
protocol which allows a very broad-ranged trade-off between
location privacy and performance for users that do not wish
to reveal their friendship graph. At the one extreme a very
high level of location privacy is possible if the user is willing
to spend the necessary resources. On the other extreme a
user reveals accurate location information towards the ser-
vice provider and thereby decreases the amount of data that
is received.
As we can see in Figure 3a, the computation and energy
overhead for encryption grows only linearly in k and is there-
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Figure 2: Runtime, energy consumption and bandwidth overhead of the SPLS for increasing l and fixed n = 1000 and k = 5.
fore lower than in the SPLS. Figure 3b shows that the over-
head for decryption is about two magnitudes lower than in
the SPLS. Furthermore, Figure 3b shows the computation
and energy overhead for fail-decryptions. These are the re-
sources a user needs to spend in order to determine that a
location update is actually not for her. Recalling the bat-
tery capacity of 20520 Joule, we can see that in terms of
computational overhead the FPLS allows for sharing mul-
tiple locations per day and receiving thousands of location
updates.
As already mentioned the main drawback of the FPLS is
the data a user receives due to flooding. Figure 3c shows
the lengths of a ciphertext as k increases. In [16], the au-
thors state that the very majority of users has less than 100
friends. Therefore, we can assume most ciphertexts to have
a length of at most 60 kB. If an LSBS would have 1 million
users, this would result in approximately 106×60kB = 57.22
GB of data every user receives per day. Clearly, this is not
feasible. However, choosing a big region such that only
0.01% of all the world-wide location updates are received
results in a bandwidth overhead of 5.86 MB per day.
The energy that is consumed for receiving data can be op-
timized with two measures. Firstly, receiving data via the
WiFi interface consumes significantly less energy than re-
ceiving the same amount of data via 3G interface [2] (§ 3.6).
For example receiving 500 kB of data via 3G consumes
around 19 Joule and only 5 Joule via WiFi. Secondly, as
noted in [2] (§ 3.6.1), the energy consumption strongly de-
pends on the inter-transfer time between downloads. For
example, receiving 50 kB transmissions with inter-transfer
time 1 second consumes around 5 Joule, while it consumes
10 Joule if the inter-transfer time is 9 seconds. We there-
fore suggest: (i) to receive most of the traffic when a WiFi
connection is available; (ii) that the service provider caches
location updates for a certain period and sends them all at
once in order to have few but large data transmissions to
the users.
6. LSBS WITH AGGREGATE STATISTICS
COLLECTION
In our scheme, the service provider acts as a channel be-
tween users. The service provider relays messages between
the sender and the receivers, but learns nothing about the
content of the messages sent. The business model of cur-
rently deployed LSBS relies on learning user check-ins. Ser-
vice providers use that information in order to, e.g., give
recommendations on most visited places and give discounts
to users that check-in a number of times at a particular lo-
cation.
We describe how our scheme can be extended to allow
the service provider to collect aggregated data on how many
times users visit each of the locations. In this extension,
each time a user checks-in, the user increases a committed
counter for that location. This committed counter is hidden
from the service provider. However, after a number of check-
ins, the user can choose to disclose the counter of one of the
locations in order to, e.g., get a discount. The commitment
ensures that the user cannot cheat and open the committed
counter to a different value.
We note that, in currently deployed LSBS, users can check-
in at a certain location without being present at that loca-
tion. The countermeasure against that is that the wrong
location disclosed to the service provider is also disclosed to
the user’s friends, which can cause annoyance.
Our extension provides the same countermeasure. Us-
ing zero-knowledge proofs, the user proves to the service
provider that the location shared with her friends equals the
location whose committed counter is increased. In order to
do that, we make the following modification in our scheme.
Instead of employing symmetric key encryption to encrypt
the location message, we employ public key encryption. The
key output when decrypting the broadcast encryption ci-
phertext is an ElGamal private key, while the corresponding
public key is transmitted along with the broadcast encryp-
tion ciphertext.
In [16], a scheme that employs hardware devices at the
physical location in order to ensure that users can check-in
only if they are at the location is proposed. It is also possible
to extend our scheme with hardware devices to achieve that
property.
We note that the total number of locations where a user
can check-in is usually large. The user should maintain a
committed counter for each of the locations and, at each
check-in, increment it without disclosing the location or the
value of the counter, yet proving that the location equals
the location shared with her friends. If we employ Pedersen
commitments, this operation would have a cost linear on the
total number of locations, which would make it impractical.
In order to have a cost independent of the total number of
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Figure 3: Runtime, energy consumption and bandwidth overhead of the FPLS for increasing k and fixed n = 1000.
locations, we employ P-commitments [33], which are based
on vector commitments.
6.1 Cryptographic Building Blocks
We recall the notation for zero-knowledge proofs and the
definitions of P-commitments in [33].
6.1.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
We employ of classical results for efficient zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge (ZKPK) for discrete logarithm rela-
tions [46, 17, 15, 11, 10, 18]. In the notation of [13], a
protocol proving knowledge of exponents w1, . . . , wn satis-
fying the formula φ(w1, . . . , wn) is described as
Kw1, . . . , wn : φ(w1, . . . , wn) (1)
Here, we use the symbol “ K” instead of “∃” to indicate that
we are proving “knowledge” of the exponents, rather than
just its existence. The formula φ(w1, . . . , wn) consists of con-
junctions and disjunctions of “atoms”. An atom expresses
group relations, such as
∏k
j=1 g
Fj
j = 1, where the gj are el-
ements of prime order groups and the Fj ’s are polynomials
in the variables w1, . . . , wn.
There exist practical zero-knowledge proofs for the types
of relations required in our protocols. We refer to Camenisch
et al. [12, 14] for details.
Extended zero-knowledge formulas.
A proof system for (1) can be transformed into a proof sys-
tem for the following more expressive statements about se-
cret exponents (wi)i = sexps and secret bases (gi)i = sbases:
Ksexps, sbases : φ(sexps, bases ∪ sbases) (2)
The transformation uses a blinded base g′i = gih
ρi for every
gi. It adds h and all g
′
i to the public bases, ρi to the secret
sexps, and rewrites g
Fj
i into g
′
i
Fjh−Fjρi for all i, j. Finally,
we observe that the proof system supports pairing product
equations
∏k
j=1 e(gj , g˜j)
Fj = 1 in groups of prime order |G|
with a bilinear map e : G× G˜→ Gt, by treating the target
group as the group of the proof system—we focus on the
special case of i = j for simplicity: the embedding for secret
bases is unchanged, except for the case in which both bases
in a pairing are secret. In the latter case, e(gj , g˜j)
Fj needs
to be transformed into e(g′j , g˜
′
j)
Fj e(g′j , h˜)
−Fjρj e(h, g˜′j)
−Fj ρ˜j
e(h, h˜)−Fjρj ρ˜j .
Macro notation for zero-knowledge statements.
We use a macro language to specify named proof compo-
nents that can be reused as sub-components of larger proofs.
For example, we may define a proof macro for the long di-
vision of a by q as follows: Div(a, q) 7→ (b) ≡ Ka, q, b,
r : a = b ∗ q + r ∧ r < b ∧ 0 ≤ a, b, q, r ≤ √|G| ∧ b > 1.
Semantically, the function Div states that the division of
a by q gives b with remainder r. Secret a is interpreted
as an initial value and secret b as a new value. In terms
of cryptography, it is simply syntactic sugar, but important
sugar as demonstrated by the long list of side conditions to
guarantee a unique positive solution modulo the order of G.
Proving these inequalities is itself non-trivial and could be
further expanded using macros.
Named proof components can be used in further higher-
level proofs without their details being made explicit. For
example, the proof K. . . , a, q, b : · · ·∧ b = Div(a, q) can from
now on be used in proof expressions instead of the complex
restrictions above. All variables within the component dec-
laration (e.g., variables a, q, b in Div(a, q) 7→ (b)) can be
re-used in the high level proof. Variables whose knowledge
is proved, but that are not in the declaration, are considered
inaccessible to the higher-level proof.
6.1.2 P-commitments
A vector commitment scheme allows Alice to succinctly
commit to a vector x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ Mn such that she
can compute an opening w to xi and can replace xi by a new
value x′i by updating her commitment, such that both w and
the update value is of size independent of i and n. A vector
commitment scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup(1k, `). On input the security parameter 1k and an up-
per bound ` on the size of the vector, generate the pa-
rameters of the commitment scheme par , which include
a description of the message spaceM and a description
of the randomness space R.
Commit(par ,x, r). On input a vector x ∈ Mn (n ≤ `) and
r ∈ R, output a commitment com to x.
Prove(par , i,x, r). Compute a witness w for xi.
Verify(par , com, x, i,w). Output accept if w is a valid wit-
ness for x being at position i and reject otherwise.
Update(par , com, i, x, r, x′, r′). On input a commitment com
with value x at position i and randomness r, output
a commitment com ′ with value x′ at position i and
randomness r′. The other positions remain unchanged.
A commitment scheme must be hiding and binding. The
hiding property requires that any probabilistic polynomial
time (p.p.t.) adversary A has negligible advantage in guess-
ing which of two vectors x of values of its choice has been
used to compute a challenge commitment. The binding
property requires that any p.p.t. adversary A has negligible
advantage in computing a vector x of length n, randomness
r, a value x, a position i ∈ [1..n] and a witness w such that
x[i] 6= x but the commitment com ← Commit(par ,x, r) can
be opened to x at position i using w .
A P-commitment scheme is a secure vector commitment
scheme that supports three ZKPKs.
Create. A proof of correct commitment generation that
proves knowledge of (x, r) such that Commit(par ,x,
r) = com. We call the proof macro Create(x) →
(com, r, (wi)i) as it proves that a P-commitment was
correctly initialized to the vector x. The prover can
then use this commitment in subsequent proof steps.
To simplify our macro notation, we use M = (com, r,
(wi)i) as a shorthand for the collection of com, r, and
different wi values and refer to it as the memory of a
P-commitment proof.
Get. A proof of a witness w that a value x was committed
to in com at position i.
Get(M, i)→ (x) ≡
Kx, i,w :
Verify(par , com, x, i,w) = accept ∧ i ∈ [1, n]
Set. A proof that a commitment com ′ is an update of com-
mitment com at position i. This proof is slightly more
involved because it requires the prover to prove knowl-
edge of the old vector value for the updated position
to bind the old and the new commitment together:
Set(M, i, x′)→ (M ′) ≡
Kx[i], x′, i, r, r′,w :
com ′ = Update(par , com, i,x[i], r, x′, r′) ∧
Verify(par , com,x[i], i,w) = accept ∧ i ∈ [1, n]
6.2 Construction
As mentioned above, in this extension the location mes-
sage m is encrypted using an ElGamal encryption c = (c1,
c2) = (y
r ·m, gr), where y = gx is the public key and x is
the secret key. The secret key is encrypted in the broadcast
encryption ciphertext, while the public key is transmitted
along with the broadcast encryption ciphertext. We employ
a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of m encrypted to in c:
Km, t : e(c1, g) = e(m, g) · e(t, g) ∧ e(t, g) = e(y, c2)
In our scheme, the indices (i1, . . . , in) of the committed vec-
tor will be the locations, and n is the total number of lo-
cations. We note that the schemes proposed in [33] to im-
plement P-commitments employ a structure preserving sig-
nature (SPS) scheme to sign together an index i with the
generator gi for position i in the parameters of the commit-
ment scheme. SPS sign group elements, and therefore we can
prove in zero-knowledge equality between the location mes-
sage m encrypted in c and the index i of the P-commitment.
Sender and receivers employ a table or a hash function to
map a location to an element of group G.
In the registration phase, the service provider executes
Setup(1k, `), where ` is the number of locations, and sends
par to the users. Then, each user creates a vector x =
(0, . . . , 0) of size `, picks r ∈ R and runs Commit(par ,x, r)
to get com. The user sends com to the service provider,
along with a proof
Kx : Create(x)→ (M) ∧ x = (0, . . . , 0)
where M = (com, r, (wi)i). This proof initializes the coun-
ters for each of the locations to 0 and can be done very
efficiently in the P-commitment schemes in [33].
In the main phase, when a user sends a broadcast cipher-
text to the service provider for location i encrypted in ci-
phertext (c1, c2), the user sets x[i]
′ = x[i] + 1, picks random
r′ ∈ R and runs Update(par , com, i,x[i], r,x[i]′, r′) to get
com ′. The user sends com ′ to the service provider, along
with a proof
Ki, t,x[i],x[i]′ :
e(c1, g) = e(i, g) · e(t, g) ∧ e(t, g) = e(y, c2)∧
Set(M, i,x[i]′)→ (M ′) ∧ x[i]′ = x[i] + 1
The user proves that she increments the committed counter
for the same location in the message encrypted in c. We re-
call that the cost of this proof is independent of the number
of locations. When the service provider receives the broad-
cast encryption ciphertext, the ElGamal ciphertex and pub-
lic key, the commitment com ′ and the proof, the provider
verifies the proof. If it is correct, then the provider replaces
the stored com by com ′ and sends the broadcast encryption
ciphertext and the ElGamal ciphertext and public key to
the receivers. The receivers decrypt first the broadcast en-
cryption ciphertex to get the ElGamal secret key, which is
used to decrypt the ElGamal ciphertext and get the sender’s
location.
When a user wishes to open the counter corresponding to
one of the locations, she can use algorithm Prove(par , i,x,
r) to compute a witness w for location i and send (x[i], i,w)
to the provider. The service provider runs Verify(par , com,
x[i], i,w) and accepts the value of the counter x[i] if the ver-
ification is successful. Alternatively, the user can also prove
statements about the committed counter in zero-knowledge,
e.g., prove that the counter has surpassed a threshold that
entitles her to receive a discount. The proof Get is employed
for this purpose.
The security of this extension relies on the security of
P-commitments. The hiding property, along with the zero-
knowledge property of proofs of knowledge, ensures that the
service provider does not learn the values of the committed
counters or the locations whose counters are increased. Ad-
ditionally, the binding property of P-commitments and the
extractability of proofs of knowledge ensure that the com-
mitted counters are updated correctly and that they cannot
be opened to a wrong value.
7. DISCUSSION
The computation overhead of the SPLS is mainly due to
the creation of a symmetric key. An actual location sharing
operation is then encrypted using a fast encryption scheme,
such as AES. While we note that the symmetric key of the
SPLS can be reused for many location sharing operations,
we argue that even computing several symmetric keys per
day is feasible. Firstly, as our evaluation shows computing
symmetric keys consumes very little energy and can thus be
done several times without draining the battery. Secondly,
since modern smart phones have multi-core processors em-
bedded, one core can be occupied for creating a symmetric
key while the phone is still usable for other operations, such
as email checking or surfing the web. All in all we thus argue
that on the user side our scheme imposes negligible overhead
to the user’s device.
The FPLS on the other hand imposes a significant band-
width overhead. However, we note that it is to the best of
our knowledge the only scheme that allows a user to hide her
friends without relying on proxies, such as in [45]. It does so
by offering a privacy/performance trade-off, which has been
proposed before in schemes for privacy-preserving LSBS [45].
Note that the FPLS is not vulnerable to velocity-based at-
tacks [29] for two reasons. Firstly location updates hap-
pen sporadically and not continuously and hence big regions
are much harder to correlate. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, the big regions are much bigger than in k-anonymity
schemes, such as [31].
We note that our schemes are also suitable to implement
other services, such as social recommendation applications.
This is because in practice users can share arbitrary infor-
mation in the ciphertext. Instead of encrypting location
information, users could share their reviews, such as how
they like the food in a particular restaurant. Furthermore,
the low overhead of the SPLS and the strategy of reusing
symmetric keys would allow to use the scheme for location
tracking applications. Such applications require rather fre-
quent location updates instead of sporadic ones, which is
usually the case for check-in applications. Furthermore, we
note that our schemes are more efficient than a unicast solu-
tion in which every user sends an encrypted location update
to each of her friends. This is because in our schemes the
user only needs to transmit the encrypted location update to
the service provider that is then forwarding it to the recipi-
ents or all users of the service, respectively. This consumes
significantly less bandwidth and also less energy than in the
unicast solution.
Although in the setup routine of the SPLS, as well as the
FPLS, the service provider initially needs to commit to a
maximal number of users n, we note that even if there are
more than n users in the service, the service provider does
not need to re-initialize the service. In the SPLS, n is only
used for checking that l ≤ n. This condition, however, is
maintained if it was true before and n increases. In the
FPLS, the scheme’s public key can be extended, because
the gai with i > n can be computed when necessary and
distributed among all users of the service.
Besides location-sharing, badge and mayorship protocols
are another main functionality of a GSN. For the latter pri-
vacy preserving protocols have been proposed in [16]. We
note that it would be possible to combine both approaches
to build a privacy-preserving GSN.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have defined the privacy properties that an LSBS
should provide and we have proposed two LSBS based on
identity-based broadcast encryption. Both constructions al-
low a user to share her location with her friends without
disclosing it to the service provider. The first construction
discloses to the service provider the receivers of a location
update, while the second does not. As advantages from pre-
vious work, in our schemes the LSBS provider does not need
to perform complex operations in order to compute a re-
ply for a location data request, but only needs to forward
IBBE ciphertexts to the receivers. This allows to run a
privacy-preserving LSBS at significantly lower costs. We im-
plement both constructions and present a performance anal-
ysis that shows their practicality. Furthermore, we extend
our schemes such that the service provider, performing some
verification work, is able to collect privacy-preserving statis-
tics about the places users share among each other. This
could be a way to monetize the privacy-preserving LSBS.
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